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Abstract: Since 2010, four Parliamentary committees have criticized
Britain's failure to promote its capacity for strategy making. Publicly,
this failure is identified with the decisions of 2002-03, and especially
with the invasion of Iraq. But the 1998 Strategic Defence Review
was in trouble before the 9/11 attacks because it was underfunded.
More culpable was Britain's failure to learn and adapt in 2006. The
formation of the National Security Council by the 2010 coalition
has yet to deliver.

O

n 10 April 2013, the United Kingdom’s (UK) House of
Commons Defence Committee published its tenth report of
the 2012-13 session, Securing the Future of Afghanistan. Few of the
39 numbered paragraphs of conclusions and recommendations could be
described as laudatory, and most took aim at the British government and
specifically the Ministry of Defence. The overall tenor of the report was
evident in its paragraph on strategic communications.
It is vital that the process [of the hand over to Afghanistan of the responsibility for its own security] is seen as transition and not as a ‘withdrawal
through fatigue.’ We have seen little evidence that the government’s communications strategy is fulfilling its objectives. The strategy should contain as a
bare minimum the following: what we set out to do; what we achieved; what
remains to be done including managing the continuing risk, albeit reduced,
of UK casualties; and the manner of the departure of UK Armed Forces.1

Currently, the British government has yet to reply, but it can safely
be said that no one is holding their breath. A communications strategy
is impossible without a security strategy, and the absence of both has
been the subject of comment by parliamentary committees in addition
to that on defense. In March 2011, the Foreign Affairs Committee, in its
report on the UK’s foreign policy approach to Afghanistan and Pakistan,
stated it “had gained the impression that the focus on tactical military
gains in specific provinces is in danger of obscuring the very real security
and other strategic challenges which exist beyond the immediate military
campaign elsewhere in Afghanistan.” Tellingly, these words appeared
under the overall heading “Tactical Rather Than Strategic Success?2
A year later the Joint Parliamentary Committee on National Security
Strategy examined the National Security Risk Assessment (NSRA)
procedure which had been used to underpin the 2010 National Security
Strategy. The latter had said Afghanistan had not been included in the

1     HC 413, House of Commons Defence Committee, Securing the Future of Afghanistan, 10th
Report of Session 2012-13 (London: The Stationery Office, 2013), 65; http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201213/cmselect/cmdfence/413/413.pdf
2     HC 514, House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, The UK’s Foreign Policy Approach to
Afghanistan and Pakistan, 4th Report of Session 2010-11 (London: The Stationery Office Limited,
2 March 2011), paragraph 35 http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201011/cmselect/
cmfaff/514/514.pdf
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NSRA as the risk assessment process was designed to address only future
security risks, not immediate ones. The committee expressed its surprise:
We remain to be convinced of the Government’s reasoning for not including
Afghanistan in the NSRA. The Government has said that it is not including
“immediate security issues”, but terrorism, accidents, flooding and cyber
attack are included, though they are all current threats. While the date of
troop withdrawal may be a firm policy, we take the view that Afghanistan
and the surrounding region remain an area of risk for the UK’s security and
this ought to be reflected in the NSRA.3

The Joint Parliamentary Committee’s comments about Afghanistan
in particular were set against a wider worry: that the problem was not
confined to Afghanistan alone. Over the last five years a consensus has
developed that Britain is not very good at making strategy, and that this
represents a fall from grace for a generation inclined to cite Churchill
and Alanbrooke as evidence that once it was. The National Security
Strategy (NSS) published in 2010 by David Cameron’s government, the
Joint Parliamentary Committee opined, “does not yet present a clear
overarching strategy: a common understanding about the UK’s interests
and objectives that guides choices on investment across government
departments, including domestic departments, as well as guiding operational priorities and crisis response.” When the Committee challenged
Oliver Letwin, the Minister of State at the Cabinet Office, on this point,
he dismissed the need for strategy in this overarching sense, replying:
“It is important not to see the National Security Strategy as if it were a
recipe book, from which one can draw how to make eggs Benedict.” The
Committee accepted that a national strategy was “not a ‘recipe book’
which dictates our response to every event, but we would have expected
to see some evidence that it had influenced decisions made since the
Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) of 2010, including the
government’s responses to the Arab Spring. We found no such evidence.
As the NSS states, ‘a strategy is only useful if it guides choices’; it is about
thinking in the longer term, and not simply doing what is in the UK’s
short-term interest.”4
The report of the Joint Parliamentary Committee referred to an even
harsher set of criticisms directed at Britain’s perceived lack of capacity
to make strategy or to generate strategic thought. In May 2010, after the
publication of the NSS and the SDSR, the House of Commons Public
Administration Committee set out to ask who does UK national strateg y? Its
answer, published in October of the same year, was simple: nobody. “The
overwhelming view from our witnesses,” it reported, “was that the UK is
not good at making National Strategy and there is little sense of national
direction or purpose.” The committee came “to the profoundly disturbing
conclusion that an understanding of National Strategy and an appreciation
of why it is important has indeed largely been lost.”5 The government’s
response damned the Public Administration Committee’s report with
faint praise. As is often the way with such things, its justifications reeked
of self-assured complacency, not least through the device of using the
3     HC 1384, HL Paper 265, Joint Parliamentary Committee on the National Security Strategy,
First Review of the National Security Strategy 2010, 1st Report of Session 2010-12 (London: The
Stationery Office Limited, 8 March 2012), paragraph 24, http://www.publications.parliament.uk/
pa/jt201012/jtselect/jtnatsec/265/265.pdf
4     Ibid, paragraphs 39, 41, 46,
5     HC 435, 27-8, conclusion paragraphs 8 and 9
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same word, strateg y, in contexts which clearly differed to such an extent
that its meaning was inconsistently applied. The Public Administration
Committee responded by promising a further report on the subject. In
turn, it condemned the 2010 NSS as “more “review or plan than strategy,”
and it specifically highlighted Afghanistan to make its points.
At the time of the Helmand incursion in 2006 only two British soldiers had
been killed in battle in Afghanistan. The total is now 349—almost all as a
consequence of the Helmand decision. Yet the Government has failed to
respond to evidence given to us that that decision was taken in the absence
of a coherent strategy at the politico-military level and without any grand
strategic sense of our national interest.6

Why Has Britain Failed?

If weight of assertion is proof of guilt, then Britain has convicted
itself. Within less than three years, four parliamentary committees
have detected a British failure to do strategy well and none of them
has minced its words in saying so. The obvious question is how and
why this has happened. In 1990-91, John Major’s Conservative government responded to the end of the Cold War by conducting a review of
defense called Options for Change. It did not so much represent a change in
strategy, as it still needed Russia to be its putative foe, but a reduction in
funding. In 1997, when the newly elected Labour government embarked
on its Strategic Defence Review, it emphasized that it was strategy rather
than Treasury led. Its underlying assumptions were more global than
European, and it stressed its ethical basis, as befitted a member of the
United Nations Security Council. Its core capabilities were air-maritime
and expeditionary: Britain would build two new aircraft carriers, due to
be delivered in 2012, and it would aim to project force at a distance, in
wars in which British troops would be “first in” and “fast out.” Servicing
this resuscitation of what Basil Liddell Hart might have recognized as
the “British way in warfare” was the principal defense legacy of the
previous government, a new joint operational headquarters located in
Northwood, an hour away from the Ministry of Defence in Whitehall.
Opened in 1996, the Permanent Joint Head Quarters (PJHQ) was
adapted to sustain several simultaneous operations around the world,
all of them presuming an expeditionary form of warfare rather than an
enduring presence.
The strategy put in place in 1998 was almost immediately undermined, but not as a consequence of the 9/11 attacks in 2001. When the
latter occurred, the British government saw them as reasserting rather
than threatening the logic of the Strategic Defence Review. The Ministry
of Defence, reflecting a similar response to that of the United States,
stressed the need to preempt threats from terrorist groups abroad before
they manifested themselves as dangers at home, and so confirmed the
need for an expeditionary joint capability controlled by PJHQ. In 2002,
the government contented itself with producing a new chapter to the
Strategic Defence Review. It allowed for preemption through better
intelligence and greater flexibility, using more light forces and greater
air mobility. It assumed the operational tools were already optimized to
fulfill that mission.
6     HC 713, paragraphs 6, 12
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What wrong-footed the strategy of 1998 was the fact that, while
the review itself was not Treasury-led, its delivery was. Despite fighting two major and overlapping wars since 2002, Britain—unlike the
United States over the same period—has continued to cut defence in
overall terms. These trends were set long before the travails endured by
the British economy since 2008-09. The assumptions of the 1998 SDR
were shredded almost immediately by the subsequent Comprehensive
Spending Review, and yet they have never been completely abandoned.
The two aircraft carriers are still in the program, even if they are now
not due for delivery until 2020. In practice, they may never be taken into
British service, and could be either mothballed or sold abroad. Since
1998, the strength of the Royal Navy has declined from 32 frigates to
13, from 12 destroyers to 7, and from 10 attack submarines to 7. Many
of these units are more capable today than were their equivalents in 1998
and in an equipment-dependent service the argument that the price of
sophistication is worth the opportunity cost of losing mass has prevailed.
It is the Army, which is more manpower dependent than the Royal
Navy or the Royal Air Force, that is most conscious that mass has a force
all of its own. The British Army’s key procurement decision at the time
of the 1998 Strategic Defence Review, the Future Rapid Effect System,
an integrated package of vehicles with interchangeable and networked
capabilities, has also not been delivered, despite its becoming the focus of
attention after the 2002 new chapter.7 One reason for the delay has been
that the requirement for air portability, seen as central in 2002, is now
secondary to proper protection against improvised explosive devices
(IEDs). Meanwhile, the Army’s regular manpower strength, which was
set at 110,000 in 1998, fell to 95,000 in the 2010 SDSR, and was fixed
at a target of 82,000 in 2012. In the latter year, the government maintained that the army’s overall strength would remain constant because
its reserves would be expanded from their current strength of 20,000 to
36,000. Even if the new target is achieved, it will still be below the established strength of the Territorial Army in 1998, when it numbered 42,000.
Initially, both the Afghan and Iraq wars conformed to the expectations inherent in the new chapter. Both appeared to confirm that British
forces would be first in and fast out. The initial success in Afghanistan,
in which the Northern Alliance provided the mass that the coalition
forces lacked, fed the hubris that underpinned what the British called
“Telic 1” in Iraq. Confirming the memories of the speed and operational
effectiveness of the first Gulf War, and helped by their deployment to
the Shia south, the British army luxuriated in a good news story. Even
when coalition forces finally acknowledged they faced an insurgency, the
British were slow to digest its implications. Lulled by the army’s belief
that it was expert in these sorts of operations, too many took comfort in
what was familiar rather than wake up to what was unfamiliar. Basra was
not Belfast; its levels of violence quickly outstripped those experienced
in the latter stages of the Northern Ireland campaign; intelligence flows
were not comparable; and Britain was not engaged on its own sovereign
territory—it was a junior partner in a subordinate theater of the war.

7     Richard North, Ministry of Defeat: The British War in Iraq 2003-2009 (London: Continuum
Publishing Corporation, 2009), 232-3.
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The corollary was that the failure to deliver on the capability requirements of the 1998 review, in both the short- and the long-term, began
to matter less. Protracted land conflict requiring an enduring presence
undermined the strategy of expeditionary warfare. The armed forces,
and most obviously the army, reequipped themselves under the need to
meet urgent operational requirements at the expense of the Treasury, not
the Ministry of Defence, but Defence has since borne the subsequent
and unbudgeted running costs.
Less clear have been the intellectual consequences of the two wars,
the sense of what lessons have been seen as enduring and transferable,
and what as specific and transitory. Protracted land conflict has required
both heavier equipment and more manpower, the latter generated either
through proxies or through the creation of indigenous forces. At times,
operations conducted by coalition forces, with their logistical needs and
the temptation to use massed fires given their enhanced ability to acquire
targets, seem to have attributes more of the First World War than of
counterinsurgency doctrine. The metrics of insurgent deaths and the
tactical control of terrain smack of attrition more than maneuver.
From 2006, many commentators began to call for a fresh defense
review. When it finally came, four years later, they were disappointed.
The coalition government, elected in May 2010, discounted not only
the experiences gained after 9/11 but also the fact of an ongoing war.
Instead, it used the 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review to reset
the 1998 SDR. Like its predecessor, the SDSR was air-maritime and
expeditionary in focus, and its key strategic message was the need for
flexibility and agility. By 2013, the Secretary of State for Defence, Philip
Hammond, was emphasizing up-stream engagement with the argument
that it is better to prevent conflicts in fragile states than to join them
when they have become full blown. The cynic could be forgiven for
seeing echoes both of the idea of defense diplomacy, first adumbrated in
1998, and of preemption contained in the 2002 new chapter.

2006: A Critical Year

What Britain has stubbornly refused to do is to reflect on the lessons
of 2006. This was the year in which British strategic incompetence became
evident. Its response to setback in Iraq was not to recalibrate, but to think
about withdrawal just as the United States planned a surge. Critics of the
Blair government and the British official inquiries into the invasion of
Iraq have overwhelmingly concentrated on the decisions taken in 200203. In terms of strategy there are important points to be made about
the opening stages of the fighting, principally to stress that neither Blair
nor George W. Bush was prepared to recognize the type of war they
were entering. They and their advisors denied reality for too long. On
the other hand, their policies in 2003 were clear, even if they were contentious. By 2006, however, Blair’s policy was unclear. His enthusiasm
for the fight dimmed. British forces on the ground were not adequately
supported at home and often found themselves caught in a command
crossfire. Whitehall focused on Basra, not Iraq, and then on Helmand,
not Afghanistan. PJHQ continued to be their operational headquarters,
and yet the war in Iraq was run from Baghdad not Northwood, and
responded to Washington not London. The United States, albeit belatedly, revisited its doctrine for counterinsurgency in 2006-07, while the
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British Army—after a succession of false starts—did not do so until
2009. In the same year the joint Development, Concepts and Doctrine
Centre, prompted by its new director, Paul Newton (significantly a major
general with operational experience in Iraq), drafted a doctrine for the
conduct of stabilization operations—Joint Doctrine Publication 3-40.
This was a belated attempt to articulate strategy from the bottom up and
to fill the vacuum at the top by providing shape from the middle.8
In 2006, both the British government and the British Army “fled
forward,” embracing the “good” war in Afghanistan, rather than confront the conundrums of Iraq. In doing so neither paid much attention
to the report submitted on 28 November 2005 by a Royal Marine,
Gordon Messenger, who had been sent to Helmand by PJHQ, and Mark
Etherington, a former Parachute Regiment officer who had previous
experience in the Balkans and had been employed by the Foreign Office
as a governor in Iraq. Earlier in the year, Etherington had published an
account of his experiences which made clear that “interventions of the
kind undertaken in Iraq in 2003 are brutally difficult, and impose the
most ruthless of audits on the plans and individuals assembled to prosecute them.”9 He and Messenger stressed the need for more research on
Helmand before British troops were committed to the province. They
urged Britain to start in a small area before expanding, to integrate development with military action from the outset, and to shape a plan to run
for ten years, not the three-year window which Whitehall had set. The
Cabinet Office was dismissive of their report and the interdepartmental
Post-Conflict Reconstruction Unit was stripped of the tasks of overall
coordination which it had been specifically established to provide in late
2004. The Secretary of State for Defence, John Reid, sought reassurance
from the Chief of the Defence Staff, General Sir Mike Walker, that the
Army could handle both Iraq and Afghanistan simultaneously, and was
given it on 19 September 2005 in words which suggest that one qualification for the making of strategy should be clear prose.
Our ability to fulfill our plan in Afghanistan is not predicated on withdrawal
of such capabilities from Iraq and, notwithstanding those qualifications, in
the event that our conditions-based plan for progressive disengagement
. . . from southern Iraq is delayed, we shall still be able to deliver our . . .
mandated force levels in Afghanistan.10

The accusation that the British government, the British Ministry
of Defence, and the British Army were not learning by 2005-06, and
that collectively they failed to adapt strategically between then and
2009, is in some respects much more serious than the accusation that
it took the wrong decisions in 2002-03. To be sure, the latter was the
precondition for the former; the point was that even three, and possibly
as many as five years on, nobody had made good either the institutional or intellectual deficit in strategy-making that by then had become
abundantly evident. The Chief of the Defence Staff, Air Chief Marshal
Sir Jock Stirrup, pointed out the problem in a lecture delivered at the
8     On all these themes, see Jonathan Bailey, Richard Iron and Hew Strachan (eds), British Generals
and Blair’s Wars (Aldershot, 2013).
9     Mark Etherington, Revolt on the Tigris: The al-Sadr Uprising and the Governing of Iraq (Ithaca NY,
2005), 237.
10     Jack Fairweather, A War of Choice: The British in Iraq 2003-9 (London: Jonathan Cape, 2011),
385 (footnote 11); see also 231-4.
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Royal United Service Institution in December 2009.11 He created both
a Strategic Advisory Panel and a Strategic Advisory Forum early the
following year. Outside the Ministry of Defence, however, there were
no serious efforts to join what the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) tautologically calls “military strategy” with policy until after
the election in May 2010.

Partial Solutions

When Gordon Brown succeeded Tony Blair as prime minister in 2007,
the Labour government had created the National Security, International
Relations and Development (NSID) subcommittee of cabinet, and its
responsibilities included the updating of the National Security Strategy,
the first version of which was published in March 2008.12 On one level,
this was an attempt to take the wind out of the sails of the opposition’s
growing criticism of the government’s making of strategy. But NSID
did not meet with any regularity, its agenda seems to have borne little
relationship to the National Security Strategy, and Brown did not evince
much personal enthusiasm for its work. By contrast, David Cameron, on
becoming leader of the Conservative Party in 2005, established expert
working groups to look at areas of policy for possible inclusion in his
party’s manifesto in the run-up to the 2010 election. In 2007, national
and international security experts suggested Britain create a National
Security Council, a recommendation implemented by Cameron when he
duly came to power three years later.
Britain’s National Security Council (NSC) is not the same as the
United States’ NSC, and in some respects it owes more to the Committee
of Imperial Defence, which Britain established in 1902, and which is the
grandfather of both organizations. As with the Committee of Imperial
Defence (CID) a century ago, today’s NSC derives its authority from the
fact that the prime minister chairs it; as with the CID, today’s Britain
has no dedicated national security minister; unlike the United States,
Britain’s National Security Advisor is a civil servant, not a political
appointee, and exercises little initiative in shaping the government’s
national security agenda. In 1902, the service chiefs attended meetings
of the CID as equals of the ministers who also attended it, not least
because the CID was only an advisory committee of the cabinet and
presented no constitutional challenge to its authority. Today, both the
Chief of the Defence Staff and the intelligence chiefs attend meetings of
the NSC, but they are not full members. There is a paradox here since
technically the NSC is also a committee of the cabinet. However, in
practice, its decisions in regard to security matters have not been revisited by the full cabinet. During the intervention in Libya, it functioned
less as a strategic body and more as a war cabinet: it met over 60 times,
and focused on the operational rather than strategic level.
The implied criticism in the last sentence is one that has stuck.
The NSC has not conducted a dialogue with itself, with other parts of
government, or with outside opinion, as it has sought to think about
11     Sir Jock Stirrup, Annual Chief of the Defence Staff Lecture, Royal United Services Institute,
3 December 2009, http://www.rusi.org/events/past/ref:E4B184DB05C4E3/
12     Memorandum from the Cabinet Office, published by Joint Parliamentary Committee on the
National Security Strategy, 12 April 2010, http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/jt200910/
jtselect/jtnatsec/115/10032206.htm
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security over the long term. Neither the restructuring of the armed
forces’ reserves nor the reform of the Army, Future Force 2020, has
been referred to the NSC by the Ministry of Defence, despite the clear
constraints on political choices in the future which such changes could
impose. Instead, the government has argued that both sets of reform
have followed from decisions of the SDSR, and so has seen them as
implementing government policies. Not only is that not strictly true
(the SDSR was predicated on a bigger regular army and did no more
than state that it would commission a review of the reserves), but it also
obscures the iterative and deliberative process between politicians and
the military that needs to shape the development of strategy and support
its eventual decisions.
The failure to think through the relationship between policy direction and operational implementation, the institutional and intellectual
heart of strategy, is highlighted by the current state of preparation for the
next SDSR due in 2015. Since early 2013, work on its component parts
has been in full swing in the Ministry of Defence, not least as the single
services stake out their positions and as the British Army in particular
plans for a world in which its core role ceases to be Afghanistan. Yet
these detailed studies lack any overall strategic framework. The National
Security Strategy that guides them is that of 2010, written before the
Arab Spring. Predicated on a faster economic recovery, it assumed a
regrowth of defense capability and asserted there would be no loss of
British global influence. In 2010, the NSS followed, rather than preceded, the completion of over 50 detailed studies of defense capabilities
for the SDSR which had begun under the previous government. This
is the reverse of what common sense suggests: either strategy should
precede more detailed study, or—more pragmatically—it should be
developed in step with it. In 2013, Britain is doing neither. Instead, it
is repeating exactly the same process as that implemented in 2009-10.
Strategy is being made from the bottom up. The 2015 SDSR promises
to continue precisely those faults which the creation of the NSC was
designed to correct.
Nor has the Ministry of Defence been put in a better place to join
together these separate elements. In 2010, the Cameron government
seized on the criticisms of the Ministry of Defence to announce that
Lord Levene, a businessman who had held government appointments,
including in defense procurement, would chair a Defence Reform
Group to examine the ministry and make recommendations as to its
future organization. Perhaps predictably, Levene focused on the story
of cost overruns, on the defense management of equipment acquisition,
and on the structures appropriate for those processes. In other words,
he addressed the Ministry of Defence in its capacity as a department
of state, not as a strategic headquarters. When his report employed the
word strateg y, it did so in the business, not in the military, sense; and its
proposals for restructuring the Defence Board prioritized the management of defense in peace, not the direction of operations in war nor
the need to link the latter to strategy. Indeed, specific efforts to address
the strategy deficit within the ministry were quashed at an early stage.
In addressing the procurement challenge, Levene failed to address the
Ministry’s other major problem: troops in Iraq and Afghanistan had
found themselves pulled in different directions from Whitehall, and the

A War Examined: Allies and Ethics

Strachan

51

latter had not necessarily been travelling in the same direction as the
American commanders in Baghdad or Kabul.

The Problems of Junior Partnership

Herein, however, is an excuse for Britain’s lack of strategic grip. Since
at least 2001 Britain’s unspoken strategy has been to service its alliance
with the United States and to act as the cement between Washington
and NATO. Many of the failings rehearsed above would disappear if
that rationale were more openly articulated by the British government. It
is not, not least for domestic political reasons. However, even if it were,
Britain would not have resolved its dilemmas. Reliance on the United
States for strategy leaves British strategic direction vulnerable to three
factors, none of them under London’s own control.
The first is that the United States does not on the whole consult its allies
before it makes its decisions. The tone was set in the immediate aftermath of
the 9/11 attacks. Within 24 hours, NATO, guided by its secretary-general,
George Robertson (the former British defense minister who had delivered
the 1998 SDR) unanimously invoked Article 5 of the Atlantic Charter. For
most of NATO’s existence, many—if not all—members had imagined
they would use Article 5 to trigger US support, not to show their support
for the United States. The United States ignored this manifestation of
solidarity, fearful after the Kosovo campaign of a war by committee. Tony
Blair discovered that even his unconditional commitment to Washington
would only be acceptable on America’s terms.13 In 2005, when the United
States did turn to NATO for support in Afghanistan, its surprise that this
support was not more forthcoming showed that it had forgotten its own
failure to maximize the opportunity it had four years earlier. Nor have
things changed much since, despite President Obama’s efforts to make
the behavior of America appear less unilateral and more consensual. As he
sought to formulate a strategy for Afghanistan in 2009, none of America’s
allies seems to have entered his or his advisors’ calculations.14 In 2010, the
President’s decision, after the Rolling Stone article, to ask for the resignation
of General Stanley McChrsytal as Commander of International Security
Assistance Force (COMISAF) was treated as an American constitutional
matter not as an issue for NATO, despite McChrystal holding an alliance
command in Kabul.
Second, Britain colludes in its own marginalization in the United
States’ thinking. Too often it mistakes American flattery for strategic
reality, and imagines it has more influence than it does. Americans are
very polite people anxious to put others at ease. Britons are reserved and
mistake warmth for sincerity. If they are reassured that they matter, they
too readily believe it.
Third, and much more seriously, the United States’ own strategy
has frequently been far from clear. The ambiguity in Washington about
its objectives in Iraq and Afghanistan has had profound effects for an
ally whose own strategy has been predicated on a presumption that
America knows what it wants. The debate about the lack of strategy in
Britain has been played out both in similar terms and to greater effect
13     Jason Burke, The 9/11 Wars (London: Penguin Global, 2011), 48.
14     A search of Bob Woodward’s book, Obama’s Wars, for a reference to the United Kingdom, or
any of the United States’ other allies, is fruitless.
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in America. This became evident in 2009 over Afghanistan, and it has
been even more obvious in the wake of the Arab Spring. Britain and
France accepted their roles in Libya in 2011; however, in 2013 the British
press, even that on the left, has become frustrated with an administration that has led from behind on Syria. Nor does Britain know how to
read the President’s strategic directive of January 2012, with its pivot to
the Asia-Pacific.
Britain’s problems in these respects are for Britain, not the United
States, to resolve. But Washington should not be surprised if it then
does so in ways which reflect British priorities, rather than American,
and which mirror a geopolitical divergence, just as the emphasis on the
western Pacific represents a shift for the United States. What Britain
has to realize is that those who argue that only great powers do grand
strategy are wrong. If strategy is about making choices, and about prioritization, then small states, and especially those with diminished or
declining resources, have to be more coherent in its formulation than
are unipolar or global powers. The 2010 NSS recognized that principle,
even if it manifested little appetite to follow it through. The unresolved
big questions of the 2010 process are precisely why Britain’s lack of
coherence in the making of strategy needs to be resolved by 2015.

